Abstract
Purpose - Retailers are increasingly forced to enter negotiations with new suppliers and have less time to develop trusting relationships prior to awarding sourcing contract. Such supplier negotiations are often guided by self-interest-seeking behavior. However, not all exchange partners behave opportunistically when given the opportunity and little is known about how and when opportunism actually occurs. This research seeks to develop a multidimensional perspective of exchange partners' Machiavellianism that reveals different types of opportunistic motivations in exchange relationships and to extend knowledge of socialization as a safeguard by investigating the efficacy of signaling trustworthiness as a means of reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior in exchanges with partners with different moral standards about opportunism.
Design/methodology/approach - The data consist of a sample of 259 purchasing professionals who are members of the Institute of Supply Chain Management and report on their negotiation behavior. Moderated regression analysis is used to analyze the research model.
Findings - The results show that opportunistic behavior originates from a multidimensional set of moral convictions held by an exchange partner. Interestingly, signaling a trusting relationship only reduces opportunistic behavior that is due to deceit, but is not effective against cynicism or flattery.
Originality/value - To date, retail managers have addressed potential partner opportunism by designing contractual agreements or by implementing structural and social safeguards. Little is known about how these approaches address partner-specific causes of opportunism. The study demonstrates the extent to which trust, a popular socialization mechanism in retailing, moderates the degree to which an exchange partner's moral conviction leads to opportunism.